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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE Of UTAH
JOSEPilli.DUPLER,L.HCHVARD

},fARCLS, B.
I. ZIXIK,

~1.

ROE and DAY I D
Appella-nts,
\ Case No. 9048

MAURICE YATES,

Respondent.

Pf.J'.l'ITJ{ll\ FOB, nt;Hl!;AJUXG AND BRIEF
IN SUP.POWl' 'l'HEHEOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come now Appellants and respectfully petition this
honorable Court to vacate the Order of the Court affirming the judgment and to rcver:>e s.aid judgment or to
grant a rehearing. 'l'his petition i~ based on the following grounds :
POINT L

This court erred in holding tlmt a Fnmmary judgment was properly entered in ravor of defendant.
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POIXT II.

Thi;.; court erred in holding reliance hy plaintiffs on
others precluded reliance on defendant.

POINT III.

'l'hi::; eomi erred in holding t11at from the termination
of !he \Vyoming action::< it. rrmst be inferred that plaintiff's were fully compensated and their claimR satisl'ied
thereby.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK
SA;',fUEL BERNSTEIN
Counsel for Appellants
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

I hereby ecrtiry that I am one of the attorneys for
the appellantf', petitioners

liL'JTin,

and tltat in my opinion

there is good cause to beliPYe Jhe judgmeut ohjeded to
is erroneom; and that the case ought to he re--examined
as pru.\ ed ror in said pdition.
Daietl this 9th day or June, 1960.
BRIGHA~:I

E. ROBERTS
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BHll£F I~ f.iL:PPOH'r OF APPELLAXTS'
PETITIOl\ FOrt HEHEARIXGARG U.\1 I:JX'l'
POI:--T'l' I.
THIS COURT ERRED I='< HOLDTNG THAT A SUJI)!ARY JUDGMEKT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANT.

We submit. that the holdirlf( in this ease is abwlutely
contrary to Ja'N and il' this opinion is per6isted in we
·will have in rtah a hybrid and anomalous .~ummary
judgment proceeding.

The one fundamental and controlling principle applied ir1 all cases until the present. one i6 that all inferences rnu~t be drawn in l"avor of the JXtrty or parties
against ,,-horn a ~mnmary jud.e;ment is sought . .Jforris
r. Farnsworth Jlotel, 123 rtah 289. :l9 P. 2d 298; 6
}[oore's Federal Practice 21:!:), § fif\.13 (3).
In cases of fraud the rule i~ stated in G Moore's
Federal Practire :!21:1 § fifl.17 (27) as follows:
"In ru1inp: on the motion the court rhonkl
remember that the movant has the burden of
demonstrating !'lenrly the absence of any genuine
isme of material f'nd, that the court ~lwuld noi
draw factual inferences in favor of the moving
party."
Under the next two points ·we will demonstrate
plaintiff~ were denied the benefits of thi~ rule and
judgment ente1·cd against them in violation thereof and
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in violation of plaintiffs' right to a plenary trial. Consternatiun follo-ws a realii\ation that all that stands
bet.w{X'Tl plaintiffR and a plenary trial is an affidavit
by plaintiff~ that they did too rely on the false statements made by defendant concerning the amounts whieh
vdcre to be paid for the various interesb purchased.
'l'hese allegations were made in the pleading,; and there
is no place in the reeord where defendant under oath,
or otherv.'ise. categorically denied that allegation or alleged that there wa~ rJO reliance hv plaintiffs upon
defendant.
In refusing to follow the above fundamental prineiple this Court has made it necessary for counsel to
file affidavits in support of pleadings even though the
pleadings tbcrn~clves are not denied or challenged.
Let us here and now assure tlris Court that had
counsel felt the nece~sity, an affidaYit would have been
filed allegiilg reliance. The result is reached in this case
beeausc ot' !.he failure to file an arridavil to fad~ alrearly
in the rcrord both by pleading and inference. Plaintiffs
are denied a trial on the merit;; because of a technicality
and tl1is Court applies a drastic remedy thereby thwarting such a triaL
As we read the majority opinion in this ease, if Uris
Court erred in holding that reliance on others precludes
reliance on defendant and that tcnnination of the 'iY_I·oming actions n·qnirPs a finding that plaintiffs were fully
compenmted and their claims sat i:died, then the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and plaintiffs
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granted a trial of the action which they have never had
under the rulings of the trial court and the majority
of this Court.
POINT II.

THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RELIANCE BY
PLAI~TIFFS 0='< OTHERS PRECLUDED RELIANCE ON
DEFF.~DANT.

It stand~ uncont.radidcd iu the re~onl defendant
made the representations a~ alleged in the complaint
and they were false. It stands uncontradicted plaintiffR
made the payments alleged. These payments >vere more
than the cost repre:;;ented, more than wn:-; actually paid
for the interest~ purchased.
'l'his Court takes the position that arbnitting this,
lli'\'L'rthL•ies~, there wa,; 110 reliance on these misrepreSt'lltatiom because plaintiffs relied on representations
of others. Of course, this i~ simply a non sequitur. If
Loth A and B mu.ke miHeprescntations and I te~tify I
relied on statements made by A it just does not follow
that I thereby declare I did not rely upon the representations of B, nor may it be inferred that I did not rely
on B. Yet ihi~ Court makes that inference even in the
fare or the rule that all inferences are to be drawn in
favor or plantil'rs here. That plaintiff:-> did rely on
derendant'6 representations is proved by the fact they
paid what defendant represented the cost to be.
Another situation i~ here presented wl1iel1 obviomly
has escaped the attention of this Court. The represenlation made by the Aimonettos and Simmons had to do
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with the productivity of the wells involved. Defendant's
misreprescntatiom consisted of statements relating to
how much the particular interest to be obtained by plaintiffs and defendant cost or what. defe-ndant had paid
for plaintiffs. 'l'l1i:; t.\·pe of representation was not one
of value or productivity of the well but a misrcpresentniion a~ to selling price. For instance B tells A that a
well is worth $10,000. (_' tells A that the co~t of thl' well
is $7,500 and a~ a lllattc-r of fact itf; cm;t is $5,000. A pays
$7500. It would certainly be reasonable to find H1at A
relied upon both representations. That he relied on one
would not vreclmle reliance on the other. Rut thi~ Court
holds no reliance upon the representation as to ('ll~t.
Take the other situation pre::;ented. B tells A he
has paid $1,000 for an interest for him. _A::; a m.a.tter of
faet hP has not. A pay::; the $7,000 to B. No reliance!
No trial on the meri 1~ may be had.
In the

Fir~t

Cause of Adion it

i~

alleged that de-

Fendant reprPscnted that an undivided one-f"ourth interest would

eo~t

$60,000.00 and that this

'm~

false. Defend-

ant represented that he had paid $30,000.00 for a onefourth undivided interest and that this was false.
Here is a

~ituati.on

where defendant falsely repre-

sented the amount an undivided one-fourth interest

eo~t

and l"nlsely represented what he had paid for one-half
of an undivided in!Nest ani! defendant then paid $30,000
for one-half of said undivided one-fourth interest.
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These representations had nothing to do with the
repre8entations made by the Aimonettos. These had to
do with what this interest cost plaint.ifl's and defendant.
By falsely representing the cost defendant was able to
get plaintiffs to pay more than what the interest obtained
actually cost plaintiffs and defendant.
It. is just inconceivable that there would be no reliance upon a represent.at.ion that an undivided one-fourth
intere~t co::;t $GO,OOO.OO when in fact it did not co~t that
much yet plaintiff paid $30,000.00 for a om~-half of the
one-lonrlh interest. Certainly there would be reliance
on this even if thc:re was reliance upon a representation
that the well had a value greater than it actually had.
(Paragraph 3 (b), Second Cause of Aetion, Exhibit D).

Take the faet lwn:-. Defendant said the 10ost of the
one-fourth intc1·cst wa~ $60,000.00, it in fact cost $40,000.00 and plaintiffs rmid $30,000.00 for one-half thereof.
How C{tn anyone say or infer that plaintiff,; did not rely
upon that mi~represPntation 1 If he didn't rely upon it
why is he paying the $:10,000.00 for one-half of nn interer;t
which cost. only $40,000.00!
The Second Cause presents mneh the o:amc situa\ion.
Plaintiff Dupler and defendant bought a one-fourth interest which defendant represented 1.0 cost $35,000.00
and he reprer;P:nted he paid $l7,500.00 for his one-half
whieh he had not paid. l-'laintiff Dupler pays the
$17,500.00 and defendant getH a one-half int.crc;;t without
paying. \Vould plaintiff have paid the $17,500.00 for onehalf of a one-fourth when that wa:-> the cost ol the whole
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onc-fourth1 How can this Court conscientiously say
that there was no l'eliance on thi~ representation in making this payment even though someone else made a m.isrepre~entation as to productivity which was also relied
upon1
In the Third Cause defendant represented to plaintiff that he had paid $7,000.00 to purchase a 5% interest
for plaintiff. 'l'his was fahle. Plaintiff paid defendant
$7,000.00. Why did he pa.\· the money if he didn't rely
upon defendant's repreRcntation that he had paid this
amount'? Can anyone fairly say that plaintiff did not
rely upon this represe-ntation in making the payment~
Can anyone say that if plaintifl' had known tbis money
had not been p.aid he would still have paid the $7,000.00
to defendant1 Is not this reliance-f Suppose t(':;timony
·was introduced that thi~ representation was made, that
plaintiff paid defendant the $7,000.00 and 1hat the representation was false. These allegations are not contradicted. Certaillly this would support, if not require, a
finding of reliance v.ithout any direct testimony that
there 'nt~ reliance. Al~;o that someone el~e had misrepresented the value of produdivity would not preclude
or eliminate reliance on the rqH·esentation that the
money had been paid by defendant for plailltiff.
In tlK' Fourth Cause defendant reprr~ented that the
50% interest cost $77,500.00, that he had paid his $15,500.00 for hi~ 10% interest. As a mat1er of fact the
50% cost $62,000.00 and defendant had not paid anything
for his 10?( interest. Why would plaintil'rs lmve paid
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the $62,000.00 for

40~-;,

if that was the cost of 50% r
How can this ·Court or anyone else say plaintiffs did not
rely upon this misrepresentation as to cost regardless
of other misrepresentations? And mind you, non reliance is found as matter of law on a summary judgment
before issue is joined by answer. K otlting would have
been added l1y an afl'idavit that plaintiffs did too rely.
The Fifth Cause i~ a tonsolidation ol' the other
cause" and hence reliance is established there.

In all of these cau6es of aetion one J'act absoluiPly
requires a l'inding of reliance. That is, in every instance
plaintiffs paid the exact amount defenilant reprer;ented
the purchase price to be.
We submit the l'inding fL'1 matter of law or the inference that. there was no reliance is ju~t simply nvt
justified.
POINT III.
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FROM THE
TERMINATION OF THE WYOMING ACTIONS IT MUST BE
Tl\FERRED THAT PLAINTIFFS "WERE FULLY COMPENSATED AND 'l'IlEIR CI,AilifS SATISFIED THEREBY.

'fhis Court asserts:
"Thus, from anything that appears in this
record, it must Lu assumed that the claims fo1·
damagec; whid1 they now asserl against Yates
were sat.ic;fied in tho~e "'"'"yoming actions."
Vle submit this is a violl'ni. as;;umption and is made
m face of the rule that all ir1fcrences must he drawn
in favor of the parties opposing a motion for summary
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judgment. Also, in face of the fact that Yates wa.s
not a part;.- to those \Vyoming· adiOTIS.
How come sur_h an assumption ran be made when
the ver~y bringing of these aetions against Yah·~ 1s an
assertion to the contrary.
Also, as dearly appears, the hao:is of the "\Yyoming
actions and of this cm;e are eniirely different. The
Wyoming cases were based on a Federal statute and
misrepresentation as to v.alue, productivity, etc. Here
defendant misrepresented the adual cost paid for interPst in welk
Lnder the principles applied to summary judgments
it is incumbent upon defendant to dto\\" that there was
satisfaction or compensation paid to plaintirfs. 'rhcre
1s no such evidence in the record. 'l'his Court has Inferred plaintiffs out of court.
In the cas61:l invlllving the Aimoneltos I he order of
dismissal wa,; not binding upon plaintiffs so far as
defendant Yates is roncernefl. He was not a party. We
can imagine 11 hal would be said if a favorable judgment
against the Aimonettos had been obtained and we sought
to bind defendant Yates therewith.
The rec•urr] here only disclo~es ihat an artion ''"''~
pending against Simmons. There is no proof of any
di~pm;ition of the case and no evidence of a judgment
in favor of plaintiff. Defendant admits this in his brief
(pnp:r 43). Disposition or termination of this case was
not even before the trial court. This Court assumes that
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there has been satisfaction. The Federal Reporter shows
a dismissal of an appeal by Simmons. \Vas it incumbant
upon plaintiffs to make affidavits concerning matters
not in the recordf \Ve do not believe any rule or law
foists such a burden on plaintiffs here.
One of the most astounding thingr; in this case is the
reliance by this Court, in defeating plaintiffs, upon the
dismissal of the Sinanom appeal. As appears in 268 ~·.
2d 217 the dismissal was entcrcd Febmary 2G, 1959.
·l'he Summary Judgment herein appealed from ·was
si_gncd and ente-red five monthr; before thiR, to-wit:
September 10, 195S (88, 89). How can there be any
justification ror thisf How could plaiTitiffs make a
counter affidavit concerning tcnnir1a.tion of a case 110t
yet terminated1 How can this Couli say that an inference may be made of satisfaction of a claim from termination ·where the cam;e thereon iR still pendingf

If defendant claimed the termination of theRe eases
eornpen::;ated plaintiffR for theit· losses should they not
assert it by affidavit or otherwise'! How C'ould eour1sel
for plaintiffs anticipate that this or any other eourt
would draw an unfavorable infereMc again A plai.nti l'f~ in
thi~ ;;ummary judgment proceeUing and require an aJfidavit against such inference?
We submit there is no justification either in fact,
law or jn~tice to infer from the dismissal of a case, the
pendem·y of a case or t.hc obtaining ol' a favorable judgment, that satiRfaction of all claims has been accomplished. Such evidence in the trial of tllis case would
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not have supported a finding to that effect. Defendant,
in such affirmative defense, would be required to establish the ultimate fact of satisfaction or payment.
We submit that this Court cannot infer satisfaction
from termination particularly when one ca8e had not beeiJ
To require counter affidavits in such a

terminated.

a situation would impose an impossible burden on plaintiff~.

CONCLL:SIOX
\Ve submit that this Court in the particulars above

set forih has drawn unfavorable inference::< against plaintiffs contrary to established law.
_jori ty opinion revolutionizes
ceedings.

We submit the ma-

<~=ry

judgment pro-

Without direct denial of reliance plaintiffs

would l1ave to file an affidavit that they did too rely eve-n
though they

60

state in their .Amended Complaint (which

r;hould be taken into consideration under Rule 56(e))
and defendant does not allege they did not rely either
by affidavit or pleading.

We submit an affirmative

defPnse of satisfaction or payment was improperly in"
fprred without Lendit of evidence, affidavit or pleading

to that effect.
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We submit the judgment should be reversed or a
rehearing granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBER'l'S
BLACK_
SA~1TTEL BERNH'l'EI);T
(\j

Counsel for Appe!Jant

5:30 Judge f{uildingSalt Lake City, Ual1
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